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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
GOOD·YEAR TIRE AND RUBBER
COMPANY, a corporation, and
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiffs·,

vs.

Case No. 6;250

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH and
LEE JAMES HARRIS,
Defendants.

Defendants' Brief
ISSUES
Plaintiffs assail the finding of the Industrial Commission of Utah, to wit:
"On the 8th day of May, 1939, while employed
by the defendant Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company,
at Salt Lake City, Utah ,while in the course of his
duties as helper, applicant sustained accidental injury in the following manner: Being required to
work overtime the applicant rode a motorcycle owned
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by the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company to his home
for dinner and was accidentally injured on the return trip; the motorcycle became unmanageable,
left the road and crashed into the side of a private
residence, badly crushing applicant's left leg below
the knee; he also sustained contusions of the elbows
and lower arms."
They assert that "During the time that employee was
absent going to his home, his. employment was suspended"
* * * and that "He was not injured while on duty nor
in his working hours" * * * This issue raises a question of fact that must be determined by an examination of
the evidence taken before the Commission. Almost invariably in controversies involving liability of the employer to
the employee, conflicts. in evidence occur. The Commission
that hears the evidence and sees the witnesses is better able
than an appellate court to resolve such conflicts. If there is
evidence that substantially supports the finding of the Commission, this. court will not disturb the ruling of the Commission. Citation of cases to support this proposition is not
needed.
Plaintiffs invoke what is commonly called the "going
and coming" rule which is frequently stated as follows.
The employee gets up in the morning, dres.ses himself, and
goes to work because of his employment; yet if he· meets
with an accident before coming to the employer's pre·mises,
or his place of work, that is not a risk of his occupation but
of life generally." The same result obtains generally when
the employee has completed his shift and leaves the employer's premises to go to his home, or wherever he pleases,
in his own way and for his own purposes. With that rule
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applied to an appropriate sta~e of facts, the defendants have
no quarrel.
However, the set of facts in a given cas,e differ so greatly from the facts in other cases that the rule cannot be applied blindly. Each case must be ruled upon its facts. This
is emphasized by this court in the following case.
Cuda.hy Packing Company vs. Industrial Commis'Sio11.,
60 Utah 161.
This was the first "going and coming" case decided by
this court where a variance from the rule is recognized.
While the decision now is looked upon as academic, yet at
the time it was considered quite revolutionary. It later received the approval of the Supreme Court of the United
State. In a private conveyance deceased was traveling along
a highway toward his place of employment. This highway
was the only available public way for employees of the ·Cudahy plant to approach the employer's premises. It crossed
the mainline tracks of two railroads and the court held that
the risk of these crossings was incidental to the employment,
and although the employee was killed upon these tracks
before reaching the place of employment, nevertheless the
accident was. compensable. In the course of the decision the
following paragraphs appear:
"It is not easy and probably not possible or desirable to state any general rule applicable to every
condition or state of facts by or under which compensation can be allowed or denied to an employee.
Courts are usually controlled by the peculiar facts of
each case."
On rehearing the court again says :
"We reaffirm the statement in the opinion that
every case must depend on its own particular facts."
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CITATIO·N OF CASES
Before stating the evidence upon which the Industrial
Commission based its ruling that the injury in question arose
out of or in the course of the employment, we respectfully
call to the court's attention a few illustrative cases taken
from the great number of well-considered cases in which
Supreme Courts have held against the contention that the
going and coming rule applied and have given compensation
where the purpose, spirit and liberal construction of the
workmens' compensation law, applied to the particular facts
in the case, justify granting compensation, altho the hard
letter of the rule would seem to shut off that right.

Tex·as Indemnity Ins. Co. vs. Clark (Texas) 50 So. W.
(2nd) 465.
Claimant was. one of a gang of employees of the Prairie
Pipe Line Company engaged in repairing leaks in the pipeline. On January 11, work was completed in Palo Pinto
County and the gang, with the exception of claimant, were
transferred to Jack County for work next day. Applicant
and two others were ordered, or permitted as variously
stated, to remain in Mineral Springs, Palo Pinto County,
until morning when they were to report for work in Jack
County. Applicant left Mineral Springs early in the morning of January 12 for Jack County and proceeded to search
for lodgings. No camp facilities were furnished by employer.
While in a private auto searching for a lodging place, applicant was injured in a collision on a public street. The gang
went to work at 7 :00 as usual the morning of the 12th. Applicant did not work at all that day. Injury occurred after
the noon meal.
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In holding injury compensable it is stated:
"We think a jury could reasonably conclude
under such circumstances that Clark's act in securing necessary rooming place was incidental to and
in furtherance of his duty as an employee of the
company." * * *

Hobson vs. Dept. of Labor & Indtustries (Wash.) 27
Pac. (2nd) 1091.
Deceased was engaged as watchman or repairman by
Greenwood Logging ·Company, which had suspended operation. His work was 24 hours each day. On the occasion of
his death he had gone on a gasoline propelled speeder owned
and furnished by the employer, to a point some miles distant to secure groceries, for his own use and which were
purchased at his own expense. Objection to an award was
on the ground that he was on an errand of his own and not
for his employer.
In holding that he was killed in the course of his employment the Supreme ~Court says:
"The action of Hobson, procuring food supplies,
was necessary to the proper performance of his work
and constituted no interruption of the course of his
employment (24 hours per day as watchman and
general repairman). Hence Hobson was engaged in
the furtherance of the interests of his employer at
the time of the fatal accident. He was killed while in
the course of his employment, therefore his widow
is entitled to compensation."
Mackay

vs. Dept. of Labor and Industries (Wash.)

44

Pac. (2nd) 793.
·claimant was employed with his caterpillar by the hour
in road construction. While working his caterpillar broke
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down and he stopped work and took the broken parts some
distance to a garage for repairs. While at the garage he was
injured. The Supreme Court granted compensation.
"The caterpillar became disabled on the job.
The job was not done. The claimant did the natural
thing in taking the disabled part at ,once to the nearest place where it could be repaired to enable him,
as speedily as possible, to do the work for which he
was hired. We think this was incidental to his employment even though the aggregate amount of his
pay was to be determined by the time during which
the machine was in operation."
The court quotes with approval the following language
from an earlier Washington case.
"This court is committed to the doctrine that
our Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally
construed in favor of its beneficiaries. It is a humane
law and founded upon sound public policy and is the
result of thoughtful painstaking and humane considerations and its beneficient provisions should not
be limited or curtailed by a narrow construction."

Michaux, et al. vs. Gate City Orange, etc. Co. (N. C.)
172 So. E. 406.
Deceased, 16 years of age, employed as assistant to the
truck driver. On day in question the truck stopped to make
a delivery and while the truck was standing still deceased
and another negro boy engaged in a fuss about an Eskimo
pie. The driver of the truck started off without him when
the deceased ran after it, caught the truck and in attempting
to climb on it fell and sustained the injury causing his death.
Held by the Industrial Commission that "deceased suffered
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an accident that arose out of and in the course of his employment."
The Supreme Court of North Carolina ignores the fact
that he had left his employment for purposes of his. own and
that fact was the occasion of his injury. It occurred during
his working time and therefore was compensable.

Gilmore vs. Ring Const. Co. (Mo.) 61 So. W. (2nd) 764.
Complainant was employed by the construction company to pour concrete. The work depending upon weather
conditions it was the custom for the men to report afiout
7 :30 a. m. for work and if conditions were not right the men
would often wait around the job at the request of the foreman until it would be ascertained as to whether conditions
changed for the better. It was a custom to have a fire around
which the men would assemble for comfort while waiting.
On the morning in question claimant reported at 7 :30 a. m.
and was told weather conditions were not then right and the
foreman told him to wait around to see if weather conditions
would get better. The men were discussing in jocular mood
about some men working Saturday forenoon in violation of
a union rule. As a result of some remark by complainant one
of the other men grabbed him and shoved him and he fell
and broke his leg.
The court of appeals held that he was an employee; that
he had reported for work in conformity with the conditions
under which the work was being done. His foreman had
told him to wait around. He was as. much in his line of duty
as he would have been if pouring cement.
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"We conclude from the undisputed facts in evidence in this case that as a matter of law it should
be held that the accident wherein the complainant
was injured arose out of and in the course of his
employment."

Industrial Commission vs. Murphy! (Ohio) 197 No.
East. 505.
Applicant was employed by an undertaking establishment. His work was. around the funeral home and occasionally he was required to go to hospitals or homes for his employer. He lived a distance from his place of employment
and was by the terms of his employment required at all
times to hold himself in readiness for a call for immediate
service. His employer must be kept informed day and night
of his whereabouts and immediately upon call he was to report to his place of employment. There were no regular
hours of employment. On the day of the injury at 6:00a.m.
he received a call that he was wanted and to come in a hurry.
He drank a cup of coffee, went to get a street car, which
was his ordinary method of travel, and there was injured.
It was contended his actual employment did not commence
until he reached the funeral home which was the fact and
the "going and coming" rule was invoked.
The Supreme ·Court in granting compensation said:
"We conclude therefore that the defendant in
error was injured during and by reason of his em·
ployment."

Chandler vs. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 213.
"The beneficent purposes of such acts (Work·
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mens Compensation) are apparent to all and for that
reason if for no other should receive a very liberal
construction in favor of the injured employee. We
are all united on the proposition that in view of the
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt
should be resolved in favor of the ·employee or of his
dependents as the case may be.''
The foregoing was written by this Supreme Court in a
case where a delivery man, in the morning, on his way to
his employer's place of business to start his day's work, delivered a package of meat left from the day before. The defense set up in this case by the insurance company was the
"going and coming" rule.

Twin Peaks C. Co·. vs. Industrial Commission, 57 Utah
589.

During an interval of leisure the employee in this case
was playing with an elevator. The power was shut off to
tease another boy and leave him stalled between floors. In
turning on the power the deceased was· killed. During all
the time the deceased was so playing the particular machine
on which he was employed was inactive. This court awarded
compensation for his death and while this is not a "going and
coming" case some of the statements made by the court are
quite applicable in the case at bar.
"A careful reading of the decided case will, how. ever, disclose that the mere fact that the injured
employee was not in the discharge of his usual duties
or was not directly engaged in anything connected
with those duties, does not necessarily prevent him
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from recovering compensation in case of accidental
injury. In that connection it must be remembered
that, while a human being may do no more than what
a machine might do, yet he cannot be classed as a
machine merely."
"While, therefore, in view of all the circumstances in this case, there may be some reason for
reasonable minds to differ with respect to whether
the accident in question arose out of the employment,
yet, in view that we are required to construe the act
liberally and with a view to effectuating its purpose,
and so as to protect the unfortunate employee, and,
in case -of his death, those who are dependent on him
for support, we feel constrained to hold that the accident in question arose in the course of the employment."

Utah Apex Mng. Co·. vs. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah
537.

While this is not a "going and coming" case the injury
in question occurred after working hours and issue was
raised as to whether or not it arose out of the employment.
The court approves the following definitions:
"The expressions 'arising out of' and 'in the
course of' the employment are not synomynous; but
the words 'arising out of' are construed to refer to
the origin or cause of the injury, and the words 'in
the course of' to refer to the time, place and circumstances under which it occurred. An injury which
occurs in the course of the employment will ordinarily but not necessarily, arise out of it, while an
injury arising out of an employment almost necessarily occurs in the course of it."
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EVIDENCE UPON WHICH. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION BASED ITS HOLDING THAT T'HE INJURY
AROSE OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE O,F T'HE
EMPLOYMENT.
In stating the evidence upon which the Commission
based its holding we are mindful of the admonition written
by Judge Thurman in the cas.e last above cited:
"It is an established rule in this jurisdiction,
based upon mandatory statute, that on writ of review, the court will not disturb the Commission's
findings if there is any substantial evidence to sustain them. Further, that the court will not review
the evidence and pass upon its weight. So that it is
love's labor lost and time wasted for counsel, in
argument, to devote time and space in discussing
evidence in conflict with the evidence upon which
the award was made."
Applicant, 19 years old, was in the employ of the defendant tire company on the day in question. He worked
as an extra man in the service department, which included
the lubrication department and the actual mounting of tires
(Tr. 1, p. 26). His regular hours ·were from nine o'clock
a. m. to six o'clock p. m., with a lunch hour off at noon. The
injury occurred on the sixth day of his employment. On
previous days he finished the day's work around 6 :30 p. m.
His wages were $2.50 per day. (Tr. 1, p. 20.) On the day of
the injury he was required to stay on for extra work continuing directly from the end of his regular shift. At the outset the length of the overtime was estimated by the foreman
at four hours. Which would mean untillO :00 or 10 :30 p. m.
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Evidently the job lengthened as time went on. Nothing was
said about an opportunity to eat until about 8:00 o'clock.
At that time applicant was loosening bolts on the wheels of
a truck and delay had occurred in procuring new tires. from
the wholesale house. The job was temporarily held up. Mr.
Schneider, the boss, told applicant and the other workmen
to go to supper. Applicant said he would go as soon as he
loosened the bolts and nuts on the rear wheels. {Applicant
Tr. 1, p. 4 and 14. Grover Tr. 2, p. 3-5 and 12. Costly Tr.
2, p. 14.) Mr. Schneider .and the other two employees went
away. Nothing was. said to applicant to the effect that he
should wait at the garage until Schneider returned. (Tr.
1, p. 49.)

Applicant finished loosening the bolts and nuts on the
wheels. Then he talked with Mr. Fox who was in charge of
the lubricating department and who was the only other employee of the tire company then in the service department
and under whom applicant worked part of the time. He
asked Mr. Fox about using the motorcycle for going home.
Mr. Fox said his car was on the grease rack and then applicant went to the motorcycle which was on the open court
as usual. Mr. Fox asked him if he was going to use the motorcycle and he answered yes. He had trouble starting the
motor and one of the ooys in the gas station department
helped him start it and he went home. It was then about
8:15 p. m. (T·r. 1, pages 4 and 10.) The motorcycle 'vas
the only means applicant had of getting home. (Tr. 1, p.
15.)

The motorcycle was owned by the defendant tire company, was kept on the open court of the service station
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where all employees had access to it, and was, as a matter
of fact, used by several of the employees of the service departments. No one states how many of employees actually
used it. No where in the record is it shown that this applicant was told not to· use it. Applicant had been encouraged
by a regular employee to learn to use it, and this. employee,
Mr. Fox, in charge of the lubricating department, had taken
applicant out two times on the motorcycle to show him how
to use it and applicant had taken it out twice by himself
and had once ridden it around in the open court of the service station in plain view of every person there at the time.
(Tr. 1, p. 6.) All this occurred in the course of six days.
(Tr. 1, p. 5.) These circumstances are sufficient to charge
Mr. Schneider, the man in charge of the service department,
with knowledge that applicant was using the motorcycle.
However, that need not be left to conjecture. On one occasion, two days before the injury, Mr. Schneider actually
talked to applicant about riding the motorcycle. (Tr. 1,
pages 8 and 12.) Mr. Schneider on that occasion told applicant to make a delivery on the motorcycle.
Applicant, on the motorcycle, went directly to his home.
When he stopped in the driveway of his home his younger
sister came out and asked him to give her a ride-she
climbed on the tool box and applicant drove her around one
block. Applicant estimates the time consumed by the sister's
ride as three minutes. (Tr. 2, page 18 and 22.) No street
was crossed on the trip. From the time applicant first drove
into the driveway and pulled out after eating his dinner was
about ten minutes. (Tr. 2, p. 20.) His dinner was. on a
plate in the warming oven when he reached home. He ate
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"a few bites" and started back for the garage and was injured a short distance from his home.
Applicant had trouble with the motorcycle from the
time he started the machine. It went to the left of the road
all the time. He came upon a parked car facing east on the
south side of the road and he could not turn the motorcycle
to the right, so he turned it to the left as sharp as he could
but still hit the fender of the parked car, then he lost control
of the motorcycle and it ran into the corner of a house. (Tr.
1, p. 4.)
In order that there may be no question that applicant
was not dismissed at the time of the injury and that Mr.
Schneider declined to say that applicant was not in line of
his duty in going home to get dinner, we reproduce the following questions put by Commissioner Jugler and answers
thereto by Mr. Schneider. (T·r. 1, pages 37 and 38.):
Q. Mr. Harris' usual duties were nine in the
morning to six in the evening?
A. Yes, that is when we bring the extra man
on to work.
Q. His wages during that period were two and a
half a day?
A. I don't know what his wages were. I know
when I started there almost three years ago that is
what I was paid. We never saw each others checks.
Q. They paid additional for over time?
A. They paid the extra man by the hours.
Q. Mr. Harris' duties on this particular day
would not be complete until the wheels of the trucks
were changed :
A. That is right.
Q. You don't know to how late he was paid
that day?
A. No.
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His work was not completed at the time of
the accident?
A. No, it was not.
Q. Did it ever happen that a man has left a
job and gone to eat without specific instructions and
come back and completed his work:
A. Not that I know of.
Q. They stay through until they are told to go
and eat?
A. They must stay until the work is done or
they are instructed to have lunch and if the work
is not done to come back and finish.
Q. Was Mr. Harris in the line of duty going
home to get dinner ?
MR. DAY: I object to that as a conclusion.
COM. JUGLER: He is a boss?
A. There were no errands for the institution
for Mr. Harris to run at that time.
Q. I beg your pardon ?
A. There were no deliveries or errands for the
company at that time.
Q. His work was on the truck to complete this
job on the truck?
A. Yes.
Q. And his day was not over until that job
was complete?
A. Yes, or so we could handle it, but he was
supposed to be on the job.
Q. He was not dismissed ?
A. No, not by instructions.
Q.

As near as can be determined from all the evidence the
injury was received by applicant very close to 8:30 p. m.,
May 8, 1939. At the time of the first hearing before the Industrial Commission, July 20, 1939, no pay had been given
applicant for his work on May 8th. (Tr. 1, p. 20.) ·Com-
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missioner Jugler requested Mr. Schneider who was in charge
of the station that night to file a copy of the time sheet for
that day. (Tr. 1, p. 41.) There is in the record a letter dated
July 20th and marked received by the Industrial Commission
July 22d, (Item 7 of the record) which this court will note
is two and _one-half months after the date 'Of the injury and
two days after the completion of the first hearing, attached
to which is what purports. to be applicant's time sheet for
that day.
This time sheet besides being "a receipt in full for all
compensation or otherwise" apparently shows that $3.28
is. due applicant for ten and. one-half hours-from "5-7 to
5-13-1939." Presumably the ten and one-half hours is for the
regular shift up to six or 6 :30 o'clock, and two and one-half
hours overtime thereafter on May 8, 1939. Mr. Schneider
whose duty it was to turn in applicant's time and who was
in charge of the garage that night, said he returned to the
garage about "8 :30 or 9 :00. They told me that Mr. H:arris
had wrecked the motorcycle and they told me where it was."
('T·r. 1, p. 33.)
From this time sheet it is apparent that applicant's
employers ·attempted to stop his overtime not when he was
sent out to eat but as near as they could fix it at the very
instant of the injury. In other words he was in the course
of his employment when he left the garage on the motorcycle,
while he ate "a few bites," while he started back and while
he ·traveled back toward the garage and up to the very instant of the injury. At that instant he was on his own time
and no longer in the course of his employment.
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR RULING ON MOOT CASE
Plaintiffs seem disturbed about whether or not the tire
company would be liable in damages if applicant while going
home or returning to the garage that night had caused damage to person or property. ( pp. 2·6-27 -28-29 plaintiff's
brief.) They ask the advice of the Supreme Court upon this
question. Their own witness testified in answer to Mr. Day's
question that there was no damage to the house that was
struck by the motorcycle, (Tr. 3, p. 6) and there is not a
suggestion in the record or at all that any damage was
caused to any person or property, except to the applicant
and to the motorcycle.
In advance of a case filed the Supreme c·ourt is asked
how it would rule if a case were filed.

EVIDENCE OF PERMANENCE OF INJURY
August 10, 1939, after the first hearing in the case, and
three monthes after the injury, the Industrial Commission
rendered its decision in which it found:
"The applicant required medical and hospital
service and treatment and was disabled from work
for a period of time; he now suffers some permanent
partial loss of the use of his left leg below the knee
as a result of the injury of May 8, 1939."
July 20, 1939-first hearing.
Dec. 13, 1939-first re-hearing.
March 4, 1940-second re-hearing.
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On each occasion applicant appeared in person before
the Commission and on the first two occasions testified
orally.
May 27, 1940, the Industrial ·Commission, after two rehearings at the request of plaintiff, adopted the following
resolution after reciting the three hearings. and the decision
of August 10, 1939:
"Now, therefore, be it resolved and ordered that
the Commission's decision of August 10, 1939, be and
the same is hereby reaffirmed and approved as the
Commission's decision herein."
The record also shows that on May 19, 1939, Dr. e. L.
Shields, attending physician, reported that applicant suffered:
"Compound comminuted fracture of left tibia
and fibula with three lacerations where bone protruded through the skin into the dirt. Dislocation of
the ankle joint and marked destruction and tearing
of tissues on the extensor surface" ;
also
"After thorough cleansing bones well approximated and held in place with Thomas splint. This
caused so much s·welling and pain in foot that leg was
placed in Zizner frame and held in place by weight
and Kirschner wire thru tibia and fibula."
The hospital bills filed with the ,Commission showing
the length of the various periods applicant remained in hospital were also before the ·Commission.
In view of Section 42-1-82 of the Revised Statutes, 1933,
this record of the injury and the commission's opportunity to
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see the applicant on several occasions certainly furnishes
ample bases for a finding by the Commission on August
10, 1939, and its affirmance on May 27, 1940 that applicant
"now suffers some permanent partial loss of the use of his
left leg below the knee."
Section 42-1-82 expressly provides that "The Commission shall not be bound by the usual common-law or statutory
rules of evidence or by any technical or formal rules of procedure other than as herein provided;"
The powers of the Industrial Commission are continuing (Revised Statutes, 1933, Section 42-1-72) and changed
conditions may be investigated at any time and the amount
of compensation changed accordingly. Even the annulment
of this award because of inadequate evidence of the extent
or permanence of disability would not prevent the Commission taking further evidence and fixing the· amount of compensation.

McGary vs. Industrial Commission, 64 Utah 5·92.
State Road Commission vs. Industria-l Commissiorn, S6 Utah 252;.
Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commission, 61
Utah 514.

CONCLUSION

1

No question of jurisdiction arises in this case. In every
detail the award is supported by substantial evidence in the
record. F'or the reasons given we respectfully submit that
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the award of the Industrial Commission of Utah to Lee
James· Harris should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH CHEZ,
Attorney General of the State of
Utah, Attorney for the Industrial
Commissi·on of the State of Utah.

..
'•

LOOFBOUROW AND REICHMAN,
Attorneys forr Lee James Harris,
DeI endJfunts.
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